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bobbio and Croce – Which liberalism? 
Franco Sbarberi
Abstract: Benedetto Croce taught Norberto Bobbio to distinguish between two kinds of commitment, 
namely an intellectual and a political one. The expression “politica della cultura” effectively translates the 
idea of the autonomy or independence of scholarly and intellectual research. Another idea which was passed 
on from Croce to Bobbio is that of liberalism as the theoretical basis of every form of civil government insofar 
as the liberal conception rejects any notion of “Providence” as a covert agent of history. But Bobbio differed 
from Croce since he never believed that democracy could essentially contradict the perspective of liberalism, 
and was convinced that true emancipation is a sort of “conguagliamento delle libertà,” or, in other words, 
that it implies a strong relation between individual political rights and the demands of social justice.
In the Preface to a bibliography of his writings that was published in 1984, 
Bobbio made reference to a “half-score” of his preferred authors. For the early 
modern period the selection seemed “almost inevitable” as far as the names 
of Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel were concerned. For more contempo-
rary authors, on the other hand, he specifically singled out Croce, Cattaneo, 
Kelsen, Pareto, and Weber since they all represented, at one point or another, 
a crucial point of reference either for his own political development or for 
the considerable range of his intellectual interests (which also show him to 
have been a subtle analyst and systematic interpreter of the classic writers). He 
offers the following explanation for this choice of authors: 
From Croce, the master of a generation that had repudiated fascism, I learnt 
once and for all to distinguish the commitment of the scholar from any directly 
political commitment. Cattaneo emphatically saved me from being imprisoned 
by the sterile philosophical abstractions in which young minds so often become 
entangled. Pareto, iconoclast and passionate skeptic that he was, helped me to 
understand both the limits of reason and the limitless world of human folly. 
Kelsen provided me with a ready opportunity to access a complete system of 
key concepts for a realistic (non-ideological) understanding of the concept of 
right that was distinct from its social basis and from the values that from time 
to time inspire it. And Weber, finally, has decisively helped me in recent years to 
rethink and reformulate the principle categories of politics.1 
1  C. Violi (ed.), Norberto Bobbio. 50 anni di studi. Bibliografia degli scritti 1934-1983, Milan: Angeli, 
1984, pp. 14-15.
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As we can see, the choice of Croce as a “master” derives principally from 
the firmness with which he defended the autonomy of culture during the 
central years of Mussolini’s dictatorship. But we may also add, more generally, 
that Croce was one of the favored classic authors by whom Bobbio was will-
ing to be “contaminated” not only because he had been the standard bearer of 
the “politics of culture” but for other important reasons too: for the perceptive 
way in which he had castigated Gentile’s worship of the State, for his secular 
ethics that was as hostile to Catholic traditionalism as it was to the irrational-
ist currents in the culture of the time, for his “ethico-political” approach to 
historical events, for the idea that philosophy represents the methodological 
dimension of historiography, for his distinct preference for addressing specific 
and concrete problems, for his insistence that genuine reflection is the “antith-
esis of academic philosophy,” of the abstract and pretentious “philosophy of the 
professors.” In short and above all: Croce was a “master of moral political life” 
because he represented an inescapable point of reference not only in opposition 
to the simplifications and arrogant claims of fascism, but also to the “seductive 
temptations of the communist world.” What Croce essentially bequeathed to 
Bobbio, over a considerable period of time, was
[…] the conviction [...] of the superiority of liberalism over every other political 
doctrine, liberalism being understood here as the foundation of any form of civil 
order, as the necessary but not sufficient condition of any democratic form of 
government, and, in broader terms, as a general perspective on history.2
This history is a
[…] product of human effort, has no pre-established end or purpose, and thus 
refuses to allow the well-meaning interpreter either to indulge in the utopian 
dream of finally resolving the riddle of history or to yield in terror to the incu-
bus of inevitable catastrophe.3
As we shall see, the acknowledgement that Croce had regarded liberalism 
both as “the foundation of any form of civil order” and as an anti-providen-
tialist theory of history meant that Bobbio could accept the basic starting 
point of the argument without endorsing the idealist consequences and con-
clusions that Croce drew from it.4
2  N. Bobbio, “Il nostro Croce” (1991), in Id., Dal fascismo alla democrazia. I regimi, le ideologie, le 
figure e le culture politiche, (ed. M. Bovero), Milan: Baldini & Castoldi, 1997, pp. 233-234; for this 
remark, p. 219. 
3  Ibid.
4  Over recent years there has been a lively and continuous growth of interest in Croce’s political 
philosophy and his numerous public interventions during the first half of the last century. In this 
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And long before this, Piero Gobetti and Gaetano Salvemini, who effec-
tively represented the radical wing of liberal and democratic politics respec-
tively, had also come to the conclusion that Croce had played a decisive role 
during the fascist years. Obviously Gobetti was never able to read Croce’s his-
tory of Italy and his history of Europe, or his book La storia come pensiero e come 
azione (translated into English in 1941 under the title History as the story of lib-
erty), all works that were written in the decade between 1928 and 1938. Yet in 
an essay that appeared in the journal Rivoluzione liberale in 1925, Gobetti could 
already describe Croce as a great European thinker who had begun, with 
clear determination and without rhetorical flourishes, a fundamental intel-
lectual and political struggle against a regime that was bent on the destruction 
of freedom. And this, according to Gobetti, was the real difference between 
Croce and Gentile since the latter always remained “dogmatic, authoritarian, 
and a dictator of typically provincial infallibility.” Thus starting from the idea 
that the domain of politics is the expression of the category of “utility,” but 
also requires an effective conception of legality, Croce had concluded that 
the State exercises “force only insofar as it represents consensus,” and that 
this force should never be understood not as pure violence, but as discerning 
justice, as “mildness no less than as severity.”5
Considered as a whole, Gobetti identifies three elements in Croce’s anti-
fascist perspective: 1. the reaction of a liberal moderate who pursues “his 
own ideal version of a Giolittian politics” that is typically oriented to specific 
interventions and characterized by an aversion to sectarianism and fanati-
cism; 2. the rebellion of a cultured European who wishes to work for the 
future on the basis of his own intellectual autonomy in the awareness that the 
victory over fascism is “not a matter of squads or militias, but of confidence 
in our own intransigence and capacity to resist”; 3. the equanimity of the 
fighter who is conscious not only of his own limits, but also of the fact that 
the unremitting polemic against authoritarianism is “a necessary condition 
connection I would refer to the following contributions: G. Bedeschi, La fabbrica delle ideologie. 
Il pensiero politico nell’Italia del Novecento, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2002; S. Cingari, Benedetto Croce 
e la crisi della civiltà europea, II, Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 2003; M. Reale (ed.), Croce filosofo 
liberale, Pola: Luiss University Press, 2004; C. Ocone, Benedetto Croce. Il liberalismo come concezione 
della vita, with a “Preface” by V. Zanone, Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 2005; G. Sasso, Filosofia e 
idealismo, V, Secondi paralipomena, Naples: Bibliopolis, 2007; L. Gersi, Croce e Salvemini. Uno storico 
conflitto ideale ripensato nell’Italia odierna, Rome: Bibliosofica, 2007; C. A. Viano, Stagioni filosofiche, 
Bologna: il Mulino, 2007; F. Grassi Orsini and G. Nicolosi (eds.), I liberali italiani dall’antifascismo 
alla Repubblica, I, Soveria Manelli: Rubbettino, 2008. F. Mani was kind enough to allow me to 
consult his essay “Norberto Bobbio e Benedetto  Croce,” which is to appear in a collection of 
essays published by Limina mentis Editore. 
5  P. Gobetti, “Croce oppositore,” in Id., Scritti politici, Turin: Einaudi, 1997, p. 876.
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of liberation because no one can renounce his obligations” in this respect.6 
And Gobetti concludes:
The man of letters and of knowledge will seek to dispel the shadows of the new 
Medievalism and continue to work as if he actually lived in civil world [...] We 
recognize Croce as a genuine master and teacher precisely on account of this 
imperturbable non-conformist mentality.7 
If in the mid 1920s Gobetti had clearly appreciated the example of lib-
erty and civil commitment that Croce was able to provide during the period 
of fascist rule in Italy, in the immediate period after the end of the Second 
World War, none other than Gaetano Salvemini – even though he ascribed 
a conservative version of liberalism and a rather “disembodied” conception 
of freedom to Croce – could describe in equally incisive terms the important 
role that was played between 1925 and 1943 by the man who founded the 
journal La Critica:
Every other voice in Italy had been stifled by imprisonment, house arrest, or en-
forced exile. His very silence was effectively a protest. It is quite true that this re-
sistance and this silence came from the rarefied intellectual heights, but its effect 
was powerful nonetheless. Many of the younger generation were encouraged by 
his teaching and his example to believe in freedom, even if they all understood 
the idea of freedom in their own way and in forms that Croce himself did not 
approve. But what mattered was that this freedom was not fascism.8
In fact, Croce broke his silence on many occasions, both in his writings 
and in his speeches in Parliament. From 1925 onwards, as Bobbio points out 
in his book Politics and Culture, the position Croce later developed was “no 
longer that of the intellectual specialist who undertakes to clarify concepts, 
nor that of the devotee of truth, but that of the philosopher as the defender of 
freedom” who calls upon educated and cultivated individuals to assume their 
political responsibilities, even “if this was a politics of culture, a politics of the 
long term distinct from politics in the ordinary everyday sense.”9 As we have 
already indicated, the decade between 1928 and 1938 saw the publication 
of some of Croce’s most important historical works, but his most significant 
contributions, in the immediately political context, were represented by his 
direct and quite specific interventions. When he accused fascist intellectu-
6  P. Gobetti, “Croce oppositore,” pp. 876-881.
7  P. Gobetti, “Croce oppositore,” p. 881.
8  G. Salvemini, “Che cosa è un liberale italiano nel 1946,” in Id., Scritti sul fascismo, III, ed. R. 
Vivarelli, Milan: Feltrinelli, 1974, pp. 369 and 362.
9  N. Bobbio, Politica e cultura, ed. F. Sbarberi, Turin: Einaudi, 2005, pp. 91 and 94.
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als of producing “doctrinal confusions and incoherent arguments” that only 
served to “contaminate” the realm of literature and the sciences with political 
interests and considerations, and to justify the growing violence of the fascist 
squads and the suppression of the freedom of the press, this had an immedi-
ate effect and was openly endorsed by hundreds of teachers, journalists, and 
artists. For as citizens they claimed the freedom to profess whatever political 
conception they wished, and as intellectuals they recognized “the sole duty 
of attempting, through the work of research and critical investigation, and 
through the creations of the arts, to elevate all individuals and all parties 
without distinction to a higher spiritual plane.”10
Croce also vigorously attacked the committee of “the Great and the Good” 
who were charged in 1925 with recommending the constitutional reform of 
the Italian state, as well as the innumerable “journals and would-be jour-
nals” that extolled the new regime. As a member of the Senate, he also voted 
against the law that limited freedom of the press, the special tribunals, the 
proposal to introduce the death penalty, the suppression o freedom of asso-
ciation. In 1929, on behalf of Albertini and Ruffini, he specifically opposed 
the Concordat which contravened the principle of religious freedom as well 
as the idea of the separation of Church and State, a fundamental issue for the 
liberal class of the Risorgimento period.11 And in the later 1939s, finally, when 
the Hitler regime intensified its persecution of the Jews, Croce repeatedly 
attacked the wretched Nazi apologists for the “zoological concept of race” 
who had betrayed the cultural European tradition of Fichte and Hegel, of 
Schiller and Goethe, and issued timely warnings about the anti-semitic cam-
paign that Mussolini was already hatching before a public in thrall to “a kind 
of resignation that amounted to passivity and indifference.”12 In a bitter obser-
vation that was made only a few months before the Liberation, Croce none-
theless indicates that the capacity of individuals for resistance can also survive 
in the most adverse political conditions and thus, in a way reminiscent of 
Vico, even transform misfortunes into opportunities. As Croce pointed out: 
My life under fascism was constantly pervaded by a recurrent pain of a public 
nature, by a sense of unease and insecurity, by the incubus of ruin and destruc-
10  B. Croce, “Il manifesto degli intellettuali italiani antifascisti,” In Id., Filosofia. Poesia. Storia, 
p. 1057.
11  See the text of Croce’s intervention in the Senate in the sitting of 24 May 1929 opposing 
ratification of the Treaty and Concordat between the Holy See and the Italian State, in B. 
Croce, Discorsi parlamentari, with an introductory essay by M. Maggi, Bologna: il Mulino, 2002, 
pp. 173-177. 
12  B. Croce, “Al rettore Giulio Hammer-Stockholm,” in Id., Pagine sparse, Il, Bari: Laterza, 1960, 
pp. 527-528.  
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tion, and from that moment onwards I lost the trust which I once greeted each 
new day, that openness to the world and the search for new sources of delight, 
the joy with which I would experience such things. Yet, for all that, my mental 
vitality was heightened rather than diminished.13
Croce’s firm response to the most serious measures and interventions of 
the regime exercised a profound effect upon the third generation of his stu-
dents and followers that were educated during the 1920s and 30s, and in par-
ticular upon intellectuals such as Calogero and Capitini, Leone Ginzburg and 
Franco Venturi, Calamandrei and Bobbio himself. They all endorsed the idea 
that history is the story of freedom as “a hope, a challenge, and a prophecy.”14 
But they could not understand, as Calogero wrote,
[…] that element of old historicism – part Vico, part Hegel, part Marx – which 
enabled Croce to perceive a providential epiphany in whatever happened, some-
thing which only made it easier for the indolent and the fearful to accept every 
accomplished fact that it would have been inconvenient to oppose.15
Above all, they did not endorse a reluctance to work for “different forms 
of human liberation” – something to which the socialist tradition, on the 
other hand, was particularly receptive. True emancipation, in fact, could not 
be exhausted by some supposedly innate human freedom that can never ulti-
mately be infringed, but consisted in an “equalizing of freedoms” facilitated 
by a strong connection between civil and political rights and social justice.
As we know, this combination of reflections on freedom and equality, and 
considerations about ways of effecting them within a democratic political order, 
would also provide the starting point for Bobbio, first of all during the early 
activist years, and then in the essays of the 1950s that were collected in the vol-
ume Politics and Culture, two of which, the seventh and the thirteenth, are entirely 
concerned with Croce. The first of the essays in question, “Croce and the Politics 
of Culture,” expresses a strong measure of agreement with the argument of the 
final pages of the Gobetti essay that appeared in Rivoluzione liberale, above all in 
his explicit recognition of the “elevated sense of civil responsibility on the part of 
the scholar” that Croce displayed throughout every period of his life. Here and 
there Bobbio seems to identify directly with the forma mentis of Croce himself, 
especially when he acknowledges the stress and conflict produced
13  B. Croce, “Relazioni o non relazioni con Mussolini,” in Id., Nuove pagine sparse, I, Bari: Laterza, 
1966, pp. 94-95.  
14  N. Bobbio, Italia fedele. Il mondo di Gobetti, Florence: Passigli, 1986, p. 72.
15  G. Calogero, Difesa del liberalsocialismo ed altri saggi, ed. M. Schiavone and D. Cofrancesco, Milan: 
Marzorati, 1972, p. 192.
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[…] by the contrast between his personal inclinations, which encouraged him 
to withdraw into the world of learning, and his sense of philosophical duty, 
which forbade him to stay in the ivory tower, between the egoism of the scholar 
content with his own isolation and the sense of duty of the citizen.16
The second of these essays, “Benedetto Croce and Liberalism,” is the 
most extension contribution (over 50 pages) included in Politics and Culture. 
Indubitably responding here to the querelle that Salvemini launched against 
Croce in 1946, Bobbio provides a critical analysis of the political thought of the 
Neapolitan philosopher, and attempts to bring out its valuable insights and its 
aporias. We have already mentioned the ethical and theoretical points which he 
had absorbed from Croce’s work over a considerable period. The fundamental 
problems indicated by Bobbio, raised here in muted form but remaining effec-
tively unchanged in the course of time, can be summarized as follows:
1) Croce never acknowledged that the modern natural law tradition not 
only harbored and generated the democratic concept of the state, based on 
political equality, but also the liberal conception which envisages a state that is 
limited in its power and functions by means of constitutional legality. Bobbio 
points out that already
[…] from the 16th century, with the early Calvinists political theories, and even 
more in the 17h century in England, up to Locke’s systematic formulations 
of the theory, the natural law tradition provided the principal support for the 
notion of limiting state power: the latter is regarded as limited because natural 
law, from which individuals derive their original rights, stands over and above 
positive law,17
and individuals derive a “right to resistance” if these original rights are 
violated.
[…] Since he ascribed no significance to the connection between liberalism and 
the natural law tradition, Croce [...] ended up by throwing out the theory of limits 
to state power along with the natural law tradition, that is, the theory that today 
still distinguishes a liberal political doctrine from other non-liberal doctrines.18
2) The fact is that Croce apparently fails to recognize that both liberal-
ism and modern democracy point to an individualistic rather than a holistic 
conception of reality, the former cast in a libertarian mould, the latter framed 
in terms of solidarity. In fact, both liberalism and democracy are based on the 
16  Bobbio, Politica e cultura, p. 79.
17  Ibid., p. 209.
18  Ibid., p. 210. 
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value and dignity of the human person, but while liberalism emphasizes “the 
freedom of the individual from society,” democracy “reconciles the individual 
with society by turning the latter into the result of a free agreement between 
reasoning individuals.”19 But if we start, with Croce, from the notion of abso-
lute spirit as the subject of history and the source of freedom, then this spirit 
is free by definition even within illiberal regimes, and the acts of despots and 
oppressors will effectively “belong to the history of liberty with the same 
right as the acts of liberal political actors.”20
3) Croce did not recognize that “egalitarianism was only one aspect, and 
perhaps not the most important, of the democratic conception of the state,”21 
since the urge towards equality already has an obscure history behind it, and is 
also characteristic of many modern political movements. The liberal tradition, 
in particular, correlates the notion of freedom as non-intervention and non-
interference with the equality of civil rights, and thus with the acknowledge-
ment that all individuals are legally recognized and protected subjects enjoying 
freedom of action with respect to the measures of the legislative, executive and 
judicial power. Of course, modern democracy also has its distinctive features 
both on the level of general values and that of specific political and constitu-
tional “procedures.” Democratic freedom, rather then emphasizing the absence 
of external interference with regard to the activity of particular individuals, 
privileges the conscious exercise of political rights and the assumption of duties 
necessitated by the logic of consensus. And the equality that results from this is 
the equal right to be represented in the relevant legislative bodies and to exer-
cise periodic control over the election of their representatives.
We know the anxieties and suspicions that an aristocrat such as de 
Tocqueville entertained with regard to the idea of equality, which always 
involves two tendencies: “one turns each man’s attention to new thoughts, 
while the other would induce him freely to give up thinking at all.” But 
would not the author of Book I of Democracy in America also add, thinking of 
the “astonishing” events of 1789 in France, that there is “an extreme point 
where freedom and equality would meet and blend,” and that this happens 
when all the citizens actively participate in the administration of the common 
good?22 As for Bobbio, he has always maintained that significant inequalities 
of economic, political, and cultural power not only endangers equal dem-
ocratic dialogue, but also prevents the free development of individuals on 
19  N. Bobbio, “La democrazia dei moderni paragonata a quella degli antichi (e a quella dei 
posteri),” Teoria politica, 3 (1987), p. 12. 
20  Ibid., p. 220.
21  Ibid., p. 209.
22  A. de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. G. Lawrence, London: Fontana Press, 1994, p. 
436 and p. 503. 
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account of the three fundamental forms of discrimination: that between the 
rich and the poor, between the powerful and the weak, between the educated 
and the uneducated.
Anyone who seriously believes in raising the level of souls and minds, of 
the souls and minds of everyone, cannot help but work for a politics of social 
citizenship. Not in order to destroy the “aristocratic claims of thought,” as 
Croce and Gobetti feared in their different ways, but in order to make the 
freedoms of all more equal in character. And this is why, in responding to 
a number of specific questions raised by Calogero in the mid 1970s, Bobbio 
observed that
[…] while it would not make sense to say that without freedom there is no 
equality, it is perfectly legitimate to say that without equality (with respect to 
reciprocal power) there is no freedom.23
And in 1986, in the journal founded by Calamandrei, re-evoking the 
“ideal forum” he had once shared with his “friends” and “companions” from 
Florence and Turin, Bobbio would reaffirm his own faith in “the guiding 
force of a movement that is at once liberal and socialist in character, that 
refuses to relinquish the great liberal tradition of human rights, and strives 
to extend it in the constant and never concluded struggle for the emancipation 
of those who are not free and for the increasing equality of those who are not equal.”24 
From this perspective, it is clear that the democratic order itself is conceived 
as a potential institutional path for promoting both the liberty that is dear to 
liberals and the equality that is dear to socialists.
4) The distinction between liberalism and modern democracy, which is 
right and proper, must not be confused with a simple opposition. Bobbio 
argues as follows:
In contrasting liberalism with democracy in the way he did, Croce [...] paid 
no regard whatever to the technical significance of these terms, but regarded 
them both in an ideal sense, as directly opposed philosophical conceptions. And 
since the opposition, as he sees it, could hardly be more clear – for it involved 
nothing less than the basic antithesis between the historicist and the Enlighten-
ment approaches – he did not put himself in the best position to recognize that 
liberalism and democracy, rather than representing antithetical movements, had 
often been seen, from the perspective of their respective political procedures, 
23  N. Bobbio, “Più eguaglianza” (1976), in Id., Le ideologie e il potere in crisi, Florence: Le Monnier, 
1981, p. 29.
24  N. Bobbio, “Liberalsocialismo” (1986), in Cinquant’anni e non bastano. Scritti di Norberto Bobbio 
sulla rivista “Il Ponte” 1946-1997, Florence: Fondazione Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 2005, p. 224.
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as mutually complementary, and this itself gave rise to the liberal-democratic 
conception of the state which now prevails in all those countries with a liberal 
tradition behind them.25
Thus even if democratic thought and liberal thought originally arose as 
autonomous doctrines in significant tension with one another, the practical 
political development of the most advanced countries (Britain, the United 
States, France) during the 19th to the 20th century facilitated the formation 
of liberal-democratic states, firstly through extension of highly limited suf-
frage, and then with the achievement of universal male and female suffrage, 
a process encouraged by political associationism and the growing aspiration 
to general “equality of conditions.” As Bobbio conveniently summarized his 
position in the 1980s:
Liberal ideals and democratic procedures have gradually become more and 
more entwined with one another over time, so that if it is true that if rights to 
liberty have always been the necessary condition for the proper application of 
the democratic “rules of the game.” it is equally true that the later development 
of democracy has become the principal means for defending these rights to lib-
erty. Today it is only the states that have emerged from liberal revolutions that are 
actually democratic, and it is only the democratic states that effectively protect 
human rights: all the authoritarian states of the world are both anti-liberal and 
anti-democratic.26
5) It is impossible to understand the history of the second half of the last 
century if we ignore the fundamental connection that has been established 
between liberalism and democracy. And that is why Croce’s philosophy of lib-
erty had nothing really to say when the moment for social and political recon-
struction arrived. During the fascist era itself Croce had “inspired resistance to 
the oppressors” and “preached [...] the religion of liberty in the noblest terms.” 
But he preached this religion more than he properly theorized it, either then 
or later. [...] But when the time came, as with every religion, to give it insti-
tutional form, that is, when the religion of liberty had to be transformed into 
a liberal state, then those pages and so many others that he subsequently com-
posed remained strangely silent, and are now almost entirely forgotten.”27
As I have already observed elsewhere,28 if we compare the pages that 
Bobbio has dedicated to the thought of Croce with the various discussions 
25  Bobbio, Politica e cultura, p. 213.
26  N. Bobbio, Liberalismo e democrazia (1985), with an Introduction by F. Manni, Milan: Simonelli, 
2006, p. 61. 
27  Bobbio, Politica e cultura, pp. 225-226.
28  In the “Introduction” to my edition of Bobbio, Politica e cultura, p. XXXVIII.
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in which he has engaged with Bianchi Bandinelli, Galvano della Volpe and 
Palmiro Togliatti, two other aspects also clearly emerge:
1) The arguments with which Bobbio challenged Croce’s idealist historicism 
run parallel with those he deployed in relation to Marxist historicism. In fact, 
neither Croce nor the Italian communists ever regarded liberalism as the theory 
and practice of the limits of state power. For Croce argued in the name of a 
meta-political liberalism that effectively dissolves the differences between exist-
ing forms of government, and that “cannot account for the role of rights in the 
process of civilizing the institutions of political power”29 And the communists 
argued in the name of a classical economistic position that simply regards every 
state as a complex particular expression of dominant class interests.
2) In Croce’s system, according to Bobbio, “a non-personalist concep-
tion of the individual (the individual is as a particle of universal Spirit) and 
a universalist conception of the state (the state as the totality of which the 
empirical individual is a part)” could “readily serve any number of dictators 
to justify every attack on freedom, and indeed on empirical freedom as well as 
on speculative freedom.”30 And similarly, the Marxist tendency to hypostatize 
the individual as homo faber and the identification of the state with dictatorship 
have been used by the new tyrannies of the 20th century to “liquidate” their 
opponents in the name of various political ends, but always on the basis of an 
essentially totalitarian conception of politics.
Bobbio concludes his second essay on Croce with the following perceptive 
remarks:
The liberal consciousness today cannot abandon supervision of the means that 
have been forged and tested in the laborious creation of the liberal state. And 
anyone who fervently shares this consciousness must strive to persuade those who 
are too impatient and those who are too resigned that the firm grasp of the means 
is just as important as the firm grasp of the end, [...] to encourage those who are 
concerned about the fate of democracy in Italy [...] to persevere in the investiga-
tion of and the practical engagement with the concrete problems that arise in a 
free community, and in this connection we can only hope that the despotism of 
yesterday does not give rise, by way of reaction, to the despotism of tomorrow.31
Bobbio had learned from Montesquieu and Locke, and from Constant and 
Mill, that the end remains “firm” if the means effectively maintain the required 
separation of powers. For liberalism, in fact, is the art of setting limits to the 
29  For more on this and other aspects of Bobbio’s critique of Croce, see the relevant observations 
of P. P. Portinaro, Introduzione a Bobbio, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2008, pp. 53-66.  
30  Bobbio, Politica e cultura, p. 212.
31  Ibid., p. 228.
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power of others, and to one’s own power, in the name of the inalienable rights 
of the person, and with a full awareness of the fallible and precarious character 
of human nature. Croce had also started from this last assumption in his History 
of Europe in formulating the golden “rule” of a liberalism which
[…] encourages tolerance, respect for the opinions of others, a readiness to listen 
and to learn from one’s opponents, and, in any case, to understand what they 
are saying.32
Thus when we have witnessed in Italy, in the final decade of the century 
that has just passed, a strong “tendency to unify political power with eco-
nomic and political power through the extremely powerful instrument of 
television,” Bobbio appealed to the separation of powers that was theorized 
by Montesquieu and identified this tendency as another attempt to restore the 
most ancient form of human government, namely despotism.33
The old liberal Right represented by Croce and Einaudi, and subsequently 
by Giovanni Malagodi, had nothing in common with the new political coali-
tion that assumed the name “Forza Italia” and voiced the “typical demand for 
law and order in the most reactionary tradition of the Right.”34 In particular, 
Bobbio expressed extreme concern regarding the “oligarchic demagogue” 
who dominated this movement since the monopolistic use of means of mass 
communication would only assist a powerful elected figure to influence and 
control the electorate as in the times of former authoritarian regimes.35 In 
remaining faithful to a methodological approach based on paired oppositions, 
an approach that reflects the tension between different types of concepts and 
the irresolvable conflict between alternative conceptual regimes (the “great 
dichotomies” between individualism and organicism, liberalism and com-
munism, reform and revolution, democracy and dictatorship), Bobbio has also 
revisited and re-examined the dyad of liberalism/despotism.
As I have indicated elsewhere, a question that would be well worth explor-
ing today is whether the oligarchico-political control of the means of mass 
communication is an exclusively Italian phenomenon or whether it also 
expresses a general international tendency towards post-totalitarian but des-
potic forms of controlling and surreptitiously changing the will of the citi-
zens.36 I speak of post-totalitarian despotism rather than of simple populism 
32  B. Croce, Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono, Bari: Laterza, 1965, p. 39. In the Ocone and 
Urbinati edition of the work, the passage in question can be found on p. 99. 
33  N. Bobbio, “Separazione come arte liberale,” La Stampa, 10 February 1994.
34  “Questa destra non è liberale,” an interview in La Stampa, 27 October 2000.
35  N. Bobbio, the Preface to his book, L’utopia capovolta, Turin: La Stampa, 1990, p. XV.
36  F. Sbarberi, “Le sfide neoilluministiche di Bobbio,” in N. Bobbio, Contro i nuovi dispotismi. 
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here because – especially in certain countries that have had extended experi-
ence in past and more recent times of totalitarianism – significant forms of 
the concentration and conflation of public and private power, restrictions on 
freedom of thought, and plebiscitary appeals to “the people” are indicative 
of an authoritarian conception of the state that undermines the democratic 
“rules of the game” at their very source. 
Sartori has also referred to the existence of a gradual “strategy for the 
dictatorial conquest of the currently existing democracies [...] that promotes 
“unconstitutional Constitutions,” i.e. unobtrusively eliminates the structures 
that guarantee rights through reforms “designed to weaken or absorb all 
forces capable of resisting or challenging the government in power.”37 In Italy 
in particular, from the law of 2001 on international rogatory commissions to 
the more recent laws on “quick trials” and “legitimate impediment,” there 
have been more than twenty legislative measures that current prime minister 
Berlusconi has approved sibi et suis, almost always in the aggravating context 
of “emergency decrees.” Are we perhaps witnessing here the emergence of a 
new government of human beings by means of the government of the laws?
It is impossible to avoid asking this disturbing question, especially since 
a significant section of the Left still appears mesmerized by the possibil-
ity of coming to certain agreements with the current political majority in 
the particularly sensitive area of serious institutional reforms. For Gustavo 
Zagrebelsky, who was himself an active partner in discussion with Bobbio in 
the 1990s regarding the specific pathologies of the Italian case,38 has indicated 
the consequences that would ensue in the context of the “power block” that 
has been established by the current prime minister:
[…] the source of our constitutional decay lies in the anomalous and extraor-
dinary concentration of economic, media and political power in the hands of 
the same person and in the system of power that has already formed around this 
person. This not an eccentric or exaggerated concern. For obedience is secured 
by this leverage over material needs (the economy), intellectual consumption 
(culture), and the power of authority (politics). The effective unification of these 
three domains of power is a deadly combination [...]. Those who underestimate, 
or are unwilling to recognize, the dangers posed by this concentration of power 
are not in a good position to address the constitutional questions of the present 
moment with the responsibility that is demanded here.39
Scritti sul berlusconismo, with a Preface by F. Marzo, Bari: Dedalo, 2008, pp. 83-111.
37  G. Sartori, Il sultanato, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2009, p. VIII.
38  G. Zagrebelsky, “Tre poteri concentrati in uno,” La Stampa, 9 February 1994.
39  G. Zagrebelsky, “Ma la reticenza più grave è il conflitto di interessi,” La Reppublica, 23 January 
2010.
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For did not Bobbio himself remind us that significant inequalities of power 
profoundly endanger the shared dialogue of democracy precisely through 
three fundamental forms of discrimination: the disparity between the edu-
cated and the uneducated, between the rich and the poor, and between the 
holders of political power and the ordinary citizens?
(Translated from Italian by Nicholas Walker)
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